Dollarization hysteresis and network externalities: theory and evidence from an informal Bolivian credit market by Bettina Peiers & Jeffrey M. Wrase




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA
Research Department




FROM AN INFORMAL BOLIVIAN CREDIT MARKET
Bettina Peiers
American Express, and Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ
Jeffrey M. Wrase
Federal Reserve Bank of PhiladelphiaWORKING PAPER NO. 97-21
DOLLARIZATION HYSTERESIS AND 
NETWORK EXTERNALITIES:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
FROM AN INFORMAL BOLIVIAN CREDIT MARKET
Bettina Peiers
American Express, and Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ
Jeffrey M. Wrase
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA, 19106, USA
We thank Arthur Blakemore, Dennis Hoffman, Michael Melvin, participants at the International
Economics Workshop at UCLA, and an anonymous referee for comments.  All errors are the
responsibility of the authors.  The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve
System.  Abstract
This paper considers network externalities from currency acceptability as a determinant of
observed persistence of dollarization in Latin American countries.  A model with
efficiencies from establishing a network of currency users is constructed.  Model
implications are then tested using a unique data set of daily loan records from an informal
Bolivian credit market.  Empirical results are consistent with dollarization hysteresis being
driven by network externalities from currency adoption.  The results also imply that
credible exchange rate stabilization policy alone is not sufficient to achieve dollarization
reversal. 
JEL F31, F41, E41.1
The U.S. dollar has become a primary instrument for saving and transactions in many Latin
American countries.  This “dollarization” has been a result of political instability and the debt
crisis of the early 1980s.  Money-financed deficits generated spiraling inflation, loss of confidence
in domestic money, and shifts to the relatively stable purchasing power of the U.S. dollar.  To
reverse dollarization, standard models of exchange- or money- based stabilizations call for
macroeconomic reforms.  As in the models reviewed in Calvo and Vegh (1990), credible policy to
reduce inflation leads to shifts back from dollars to domestic currency.  
Experiences of several Latin American countries show that policy credibility alone may
not be sufficient for dedollarization.  For example, while Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru contained
hyperinflations in the mid-1980s, the ratio of dollar to domestic bank deposits, a crude proxy for
dollarization,  has not declined significantly in these countries.  In Bolivia there has been an
increase in the proxy measure following successful monetary and fiscal reforms in 1985.  As
shown in Table 1, foreign currency deposits as a percentage of domestic M2 rose from 35 percent
in 1986 to 63 percent in 1991.  
Of course, true dollar circulation is unobservable, and deposit data measure dollarization
only partially.  For Bolivia, an alternative to deposit data as a dollarization measure is provided by
loan data from informal credit markets.  The informal loans, as outlined in Melvin and Ladman
(1991) and Melvin and Fenske (1992), are made in competitive and unregulated markets, which
frees the loan data from government-induced biases that plague traditional deposit-based
dollarization measures.  Such biases arise from official investment constraints and foreign
exchange confiscations that distort bank deposit measures to a greater degree than informal and
unregulated loans.  For Bolivia, as with the deposit-based dollarization proxy, informal loan data2
point to increased dollarization following successful policy reforms.  Table 1 shows an increase in
loan dollarization from 47 percent in 1985 to 84 percent in 1987.  At least for policymakers
interested in autonomy, it is of interest to determine factors that inhibit returns to domestic
currency use following successful stabilizations.
Kamin and Ericsson (1993), in the first extensive empirical study of currency hysteresis,
consider macroeconomic factors, such as domestic inflation, that reflect policy.  They find, for
example, that the maximum past domestic inflation rate for a dollarized country has a statistically
significant “ratchet” effect on dollarization.  The larger is maximum past inflation, the more likely
it is for dollarization to persist. It remains of interest to determine the underlying factors that give
rise to such ratcheting.  Factors receiving recent theoretical attention are transaction costs and
financial adaptation.  Guidotti and Rodriguez (1991), for example, construct a transaction cost
model with a neutral band for inflation, within which there is no incentive to dedollarize. 
Switching back to domestic currency following dollarization will occur only if domestic inflation
is low enough to overcome a transaction cost differential between use of dollars versus the
domestic currency.  Sturzenegger (1992) extends the theory by emphasizing scale economies and
financial adaptation as forces behind hysteresis effects driven by transactions costs.  This paper
follows the recent line of transaction cost explanations of dollarization  and hysteresis by
constructing a transaction cost model with network externalities associated with currency use. 
Implications of the model are analyzed using data from informal Bolivian markets for dollar and
domestic currency loans along with measures of currency network effects.
Section I of the paper presents a transaction cost model of dollarization and empirically
tractable implications for decisions to borrow and lend in dollars versus domestic currency. 3
Section II discusses the informal Bolivian loan market.  Section III applies a structural probit
estimation procedure to the data.  Section IV provides quantitative results.  Section V concludes.   
I.  A transaction cost model of a dollarized economy
Consider a model with a single good and identical multi-member households, each consisting of a
financial intermediary, goods seller, and shopper.  Each period, shoppers buy goods from sellers
using domestic currency (Bolivian in our case) and foreign currency (U.S. dollars) obtained by
borrowing from intermediaries.  For convenience, Table 2 lists and describes variables used in the
model.  We use * superscripts to denote variables denominated in dollars.  Lower case household
decision variables represent quantities demanded while upper case represents quantities supplied. 
We proceed by describing specific trading opportunities facing the intermediary, seller, and
shopper members of a typical household.
I.A.  Intermediary
At nominal exchange rate e the intermediary divides the household’s beginning of period nominal t
wealth according to:
M + e M  = L + e L   <1> ttt tt t
**
L and L  are the domestic and dollar loans made available by the intermediary to shoppers at tt
*
going interest rates R and R  .   The intermediary is assumed to incur real transaction costs in tt
*1
making loans.  These costs take the form:  (L/P , T  , POL) for Bolivian currency loans; and
Ls
tt t t
(L /P  , T  , POL ) for dollar loans.  Transaction costs are increasing in real loan supplies, i.e. 
L* * * s
tt t t
>0,   >0.  
LL *
114
T  represents an index of factors that reduce (increase) the marginal transaction cost of
s
t
lending an extra dollar (Bolivian currency unit), i.e.  >0,   <0.    We take these factors that
LL * 2
1,2 1,2
influence loan supply costs to arise from externalities present from a network of agents who use
dollars in financial markets.  If, for example, the partial derivatives of the transaction cost
functions just identified are both nonzero, a network of dollar users increases the marginal cost of
lending Bolivian currency and decreases the marginal cost of lending dollars.  Externality effects
from a currency network can be gauged empirically by a number of factors which we discuss in
section IV.  Note that the loan supply-side factors captured by T  may include variables with
s
t
inertia, which can generate hysteresis effects of dollar usage.
POL in the intermediary’s cost functions represents an index of Bolivian policy credibility t
that can influence transactions costs independently from network externality effects.  We assume
that low credibility reduces (increases) the marginal transactions cost of making dollar (Bolivian
currency) loans, i.e. an increase in POL is taken to capture a decline in domestic policy credibility t
and    >0,   <0.
LL *
1,3 1,3
I.B.  Goods seller




Y  = Y + Y   <2>
T*
tt t
with Y (Y ) being sold in the domestic market at domestic currency (dollar) price P (P ).  For tt tt
* *
simplicity, we assume the firm does not engage in international trade.5
I.C.  Shopper
Prior to purchasing goods, a household’s shopper borrows l (l ) units of domestic currency tt
*
(dollars) from an intermediary.  The domestic balance is used to purchase C units of the good at t
Bolivian currency price P.  The dollar balance is used to purchase C  units of the good at dollar tt
*
price P .  In transacting, the shopper incurs the following real transaction costs: 
*
t
(C , l /P , T  , POL) for Bolivian currency purchases; and  (C  , l /P , T , POL) for dollar
Cd C*  * * * d
t, t t t t t t t t t
purchases. The shopper’s costs are increasing in volumes of transactions, i.e.,  >0,   >0, and
CC *
11
decreasing in real balances used to execute a given volume of transactions, i.e.,  <0,   <0.
CC *
22
The shopper’s costs also depend on currency network externalities from dollar usage. 
These factors, present here on the demand side of the loan market, are represented by T .  We
d
t
assume that  >0 and  <0, so that as T  increases, the increased experience with and
CC * d
2,3 2,3 t
adaptation to dollar-denominated transactions will increase consumer benefits by reducing the
marginal cost of borrowing and spending dollars.  Section IV describes empirical proxies that we
use to capture the demand side externality effects.
As with the intermediary, policy credibility enters as POL in shoppers’ transactions cost t
functions.  We specify that the marginal cost of borrowing in Bolivian currency (dollars) rises
(falls or is unchanged), the lower is Bolivian policy credibility,  i.e., an increase in POL is taken t
to capture a decline in domestic policy credibility and    >0,    <0.
CC *
2,4 2,4
I.D.  Household budget and choice problem
At the end of each period, household members settle all repayments and regroup to consume
goods.  A goods seller returns home with Bolivian currency (dollar) receipts PY (P Y ).  The tt t t
**6
shopper brings home l-P(C+ (t))-(1+R)l in domestic currency and l -P (C + (t))-(1+R )l ttt t t t t t tt
C* * * C * * *
dollars.  The intermediary brings home proceeds from extending Bolivian and dollar loans, net of
transaction costs.  If we add cash positions of all household members, end-of-period domestic and
dollar cash balances are:
M =(1+R)L-P (t)+PY+l-P[C+ (t)]-(1+R)l <3> t + 1 ttt t ttt t t t  
LC
M* =(1+R*)L*-P* (t)+P*Y*+l*-P*[C*+ (t)]-(1+R*)l* <4> t + 1 ttt t ttt t t t
L* C*
The household orders consumption sequences according to utility measure U=E µ(C , C ), t0 t t
4 j*
where E is an expectation conditioned on information dated t and earlier.  Given beginning t
money balances M and M , the household maximizes utility subject to <1>-<4> by choosing tt
*
sequences of consumptions, supply quantities for the seller, and loan balances taking prices,
interest rates, exchange rates, and factors T  , T  , POL as given.  Optimality conditions
ds
tt t
associated with a typical household’s problem include:
R =  (C , l/P , T  , POL)  <5> t2 t t t t t
Cd
R =   (C  , l /P  , T  , POL)  <6>
*C * * * * d
tt t t t t
E(e/e ) = [1+R -  (L /P  , T  , POL)]/[1+R - (L/P , T  ,POL)]  <7> t t t + 1 t 1 t tt t t1 t tt t
*L * * *s L s
Conditions <5> and <6> indicate that the shopper borrows up to where the marginal transaction
value of each currency equals the marginal interest cost.  Condition <7>, associated with the
intermediary’s loan supply, gives interest rate parity in the presence of  transactions cost effects.
To arrive at relations suitable for estimation, we assume the following cost functional forms:
 = (C)  (l/P) (T ) (POL) <8>
C 1- 2e - 3- 4
tt t t t
 = (C ) (l /P ) (T ) (POL) <9>
C* * 1* * - 2d 3 4
tt t t t




















































<8> and <9> into <5> and <6> gives loan demands:
 <10>
<11>
Bolivian currency (dollar) loan demand is decreasing (increasing) in externality index T  , and is 
d
t
negatively related to the cost of borrowing R (R ). tt
*
Similarly, we specify the intermediary’s transaction cost functions as:
 = (L/P) (T ) (POL) <12>
L 1s 2 3
tt t t
 = (L /P ) (T )  (POL) <13>
L* * * 1s - 2- 3
tt t t
where  i>0 for i=1,3;  i>0 for i=1,2;  2>0; and  3>0.  Differentiating and substituting the results
into <7> gives dollar loan supply:
<14>
 
Given (l/P), <14> implies that the dollar loan supply is increasing (decreasing) in the dollar tt
(Bolivian) interest rate R  (R).  Dollar loan supply also is positively related to expected exchange
*
tt
rate depreciation, supply externality index T , and policy credibility index POL.
s3
tt
I.E. Reduced-form loan equation implied by the theory
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8
loan market equilibrium conditions.  Substituting (l/P) from <10> for  (L/P) in <14> to impose tt tt
domestic currency loan equilibrium gives relations of the form:
(l /P ) = f ( R  ,   R ,   E(e /e) ,   T  ,   T  ,   C ,   POL )
** * d
tt t t t t + 1 t t t t
                                                    +        -            +            +       +       -        +
                                            
      
(L /P ) = g ( R  ,   T  ,   C  ,   POL ) 
** * d *
tt t t t t
                                                                      -         +       +         +         
where signs of the partial derivatives are shown below each variable. 
To proceed toward estimation, the functional relations governing dollar loan supply
(L /P ) and demand (l /P ) can be summarized by two linear regressions:
** **
tt tt





















































          Equation <15> provides direction for the empirical modeling of Bolivian loan dollarization. 
According to <15>, dollar loans increase with a decrease in the Bolivian currency denominated
interest rate R; an increase in expected Bolivian currency depreciation E(e /e); a rise in dollar t tt + 1t
networking factors T  and T ; and a deterioration in Bolivian policy credibility POL.
ds 4
tt t
II.  Data issues
Agricultural areas in Bolivia have active informal loan markets together with underdeveloped
formal financial markets.  Data on loans in informal markets are available from records kept by
local claims judges.  We employ such data here, which were collected in a USAID study by
Ladman and Luna (1988).  Generally, loans in the informal market are from individual to
individual and are denominated in either Bolivian currency or U.S. dollars.   Lenders demand
5
registration of loans with claims judges so that legal documentation exists for collection purposes. 
Hence, one can expect the loan records to adequately represent actual lending practices.  The data
that we employ are a set of daily loan records for three towns in the Bolivian Upper Cochabamba
region.  The complete data set contains 8,284 observations from loan records dating January 1,
1980, through July 15, 1987.  We exclude, however, loan records from November 1982 through
September 1985 when dollar-denominated contracts were illegal.
To account for factors that influence the choice of currency in a loan, dollarization










to use in a loan.  Our empirical treatment is to regress the probability of a dollar-denominated loan
on variables expected to impact the probability in the same fashion as the explanatory factors for
loan choices indicated by <15>.  Straightforward probit analysis is not allowed by our data,
however, because of the sample selection bias that, whenever a loan is observed in the data, only
the interest rate relevant for that particular currency loan is recorded.  In the case of a dollar-
denominated loan, for example, the related Bolivian currency interest rate prevailing at the time of
the loan is not observed.  To account for this latent variable, a three-step estimation procedure of 
Lee (1979) is applied.  Lee’s procedure supplies consistent estimates of unobserved interest rates. 
III.  Structural probit analysis
To cast implications from equation <15> into an empirical currency choice setting we
record the dependent variable in <15> as CURR =1 if a loan is denominated in dollars and
DOL
t




RBOL  represents an estimate of the Bolivian interest rate in the informal loan market, obtained
* 
from Lee’s procedure as outlined in the Appendix.  DEX is the expected depreciation rate as
measured by the realized monthly percentage change in the informal market exchange rate.  T
d
and T  are exogenous domestic factors that reflect network externalities from dollar acceptability.  
s
To capture loan-demand side externality factors in T  we use the following proxies:
d
CUMLOANS:Cumulative daily dollar to total number of loans recorded in the informal market up11
to but excluding time t.
CUMVALUE: Cumulative daily dollar to total value of loans recorded up to but excluding time t.
The share of prior loans denominated in dollars is taken to serve as a gauge for positive effects on
dollar-loan demand of a growing dollar-user network.
To capture loan supply-side externality factors in T  we use the following proxies:
s
EXSPREAD: Differential between the black market and official Bolivian currency to dollar
exchange rate.
BANKSPREAD: Percentage spread of the average lending over borrowing rate on domestic
currency loans in the official Bolivian banking system.
Supply-side network effects from dollar usage, T , identify an increased (decreased) incentive for
s
lenders to offer dollar-denominated (Bolivian currency) financial instruments in the informal
banking sector.  The greater the misalignment of the official exchange rate, i.e., the larger
EXSPREAD, the greater the lenders’ profit potential from supplying dollars informally. 
Similarly, the larger the financial risk of Bolivian currency loans in the official banking sector, the
greater the propensity for dollar lending in the informal market.
To isolate hysteresis effects on dollarization that are associated with lack of domestic
policy credibility from effects associated with network externalities, we include POLICY proxies
in <16>.  Five POLICY proxies are considered:
BOLINFLVOL: Realized monthly volatility in the Bolivian inflation rate as measured by the
consumer price index.
BOLDEPVOL: Realized monthly volatility in the black market depreciation rate.
INFMAX: Past maximum Bolivian inflation rate.
INFVOLMAX: Past maximum Bolivian inflation volatility.12
DEPVOLMAX: Past maximum parallel market depreciation volatility.
The first two of the POLICY proxies are used to capture negative monetary policy expectations. 
The remaining three proxies are “ratchet variables” to capture learning or expectations adjustment
periods before domestic agents become convinced that current macroeconomic stability has
permanence and inflationary policies will not be repeated.  Persistence in agents’ negative policy
outlooks can introduce ratchet effects, as in Kamin and Ericsson (1993).
Regression equation <17> also contains dummy variables.  REFORM85 captures the
Bolivian stabilization policy announced in August 1985 and accounts for the break in the data set. 
It is set to zero until October 1, 1985 (the first observation following legalization of dollar
holdings) and is one thereafter.  Dummies are also included for seasonal lending patterns in the
largely agricultural Cochabamba region.  The harvest period is in the South American fall (March,
April, May) and is captured by the constant term.  DUMWIN is set to one if a loan occurred in
June, July, or August; DUMSPR is one if a loan was in September, October, or November; and
DUMSUM is one for loans in December, January, or February.
IV.  Probit results 
Results from estimating the structural probit in <17> are shown in Tables 3 to 6.  To avoid
multicollinearity, only one demand-side (T ) and one supply-side (T ) externality proxy is
ds
tt
introduced at a time.  Two procedures for proxying lack of policy credibility are considered. 
Initially, only ratchet effects are included in the estimation.  Since the ratchet variables INFMAX,
INFVOLMAX, and DEPVOLMAX attain maximum values at the time when the break in the data13
occurs (October 1985) and become constants thereafter, REFORM85 is omitted from the
regression.  Because of their correlation with REFORM85, however, the ratchet variables may not
appropriately reflect underlying rigidities in policy credibility.  Thus, a second procedure is
employed in which REFORM85 is paired with each of the policy credibility variables
BOLINFVOL and BOLDEPVOL.  Since the credibility variables are continuous series whose
values fluctuate over the entire sample period, this second procedure ensures that the lack-of-
credibility effects are clearly isolated from effects associated with the sample break.
The estimation results support implications of the theoretical model.  Coefficients in the
structural equation generally exhibit the theoretically correct signs and are statistically significant. 
Based on the likelihood ratio test statistics and the percentage of correct 0-1 predictions, the
empirical model provides a good fit.  According to the empirical results for equation <16>, the
probability of a dollar-denominated loan falls significantly with a higher Bolivian interest rate
estimate, and there is generally a positive association with the depreciation rate of the domestic
currency against the dollar.  Also, as the theory predicts, the probability of a dollar loan rises
significantly when there is an increase in the network externality variables.  Both the T  and T
ds
tt
proxies exhibit statistically significant positive effects on dollarization.  This result is robust to the
inclusion of different proxies capturing lack of policy credibility.
Considered individually, the ratchet variables raise the probability of a dollar-denominated
loan.  However, in estimations not reported here it was found that INFMAX, INFVOLMAX, and
DEPVOLMAX become insignificant when included with REFORM85 in the same regression. 
This implies that the ratchet variables may capture more than just lack of policy credibility.  They
also proxy for the break in the data and, specifically, legalization of dollar contracts after the14
hyperinflation.  To deal with the problem, as identified earlier, REFORM85 is included separately
in the regression.  Its highly significant positive estimate captures the data break, while
macroeconomic policy changes enter separately through BOLINFVOL and BOLDEPVOL.  In line
with the theory, the results indicate that the larger the monthly inflation and depreciation
volatility, the greater the uncertainty about Bolivian macroeconomic policy and, hence, the more
likely a switch to dollar loans. 
The results also identify seasonalities in the pattern of dollar relative to Bolivian currency
loans.  Loans made in the South American fall, the main harvest season, are reflected in the
constant term.  The three dummies for other seasons exhibit negative coefficients, although only
DUMSPR is statistically significant.  So, relative to the fall season, the probability of a dollar loan
is lowest in the South American spring.  Winter and summer seasons do not significantly alter the
probability of a dollar loan, as observed for the main harvest period.
V.  Simulation
Since probit is nonlinear, coefficient estimates do not constitute relevant partial
derivatives.  Instead, the results must be interpreted at particular values for the independent
variables.  A common approach is to evaluate probabilities at sample means for all variables that
simply serve as controls and to compute effects of a one-standard-deviation increase in a variable
of interest.  This approach is used in Table 7 to gauge the relative importance of network
externality and policy credibility proxies on dollarization.  RBOL , DEX, REFORM85 and
*
seasonal dummies are set at their mean values.  Eight simulation results are presented.
Note in Table 7 that the base probability of a dollar loan is higher when the official15
domestic interest rate differential (BANKSPREAD) is included--panels C and D--than when the
Bolivian exchange rate spread (EXSPREAD) is included as a T  proxy--panels A and B.  For
s
instance, by introducing CUMLOANS, BOLINFVOL, and EXSPREAD in the same regression,
the sample mean probability of a dollar loan is .6406 as shown in column 1 of panel A.  This
value rises to .7123 when EXSPREAD is replaced by BANKSPREAD as shown in column 1 of
panel C.  Similarly, when CUMLOANS and BOLDEPVOL are combined with EXSPREAD and
BANKSPREAD, the probability estimates are .5793 and .7291, respectively (third row of column
1, panels A and C).
There is only a slight mean probability difference when CUMLOANS is replaced by
CUMVALUE as a demand-side externality proxy.  For instance, a combination of CUMVALUE,
BOLDEPVOL, and BANKSPREAD produces a probability estimate of .7157 as opposed to .7291
when CUMLOANS is employed (third row of column 1, panels C and D).  The largest difference
arises in a pairing with EXSPREAD and BOLDEPVOL where, using CUMLOANS, the
probability of a dollar loan is .5793 versus .4960 by including CUMVALUE (third row of column
1, panels A and B).
The economic significance of the network externality proxies is seen by calculating
probability changes associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in the respective variables. 
The largest economic impact is from changes in the demand-side proxies.  For example, when
CUMVALUE, EXSPREAD, and BOLDEPVOL are combined and the cumulative dollar to total
loan value increases by one standard deviation, the probability of a dollar-denominated loan rises
from .4960 to .5714 (third row of columns 1 and 2, panel B).  This probability increase of 7.5
percentage points indicates that CUMVALUE has a significant economic effect on dollarization. 16
The effect is still positive but somewhat smaller when Bolivian inflation volatility, BOLINFVOL, 
replaces Bolivian depreciation volatility, BOLDEPVOL,  as a policy proxy (first row of columns 1
and 2,  panel B) and when CUMLOAN replaces CUMVALUE (first row of columns 1 and 2,
panel A).
On the loan supply side, externality effects reflected in changes in the Bolivian bank
interest spread have the weakest impact on changes in dollarization.  Combining BANKSPREAD
with CUMLOANS, the probability of a dollar loan rises by 1 (1.6) percent when BOLINFVOL
(BOLDEPVOL) is included and BANKSPREAD increases by one standard deviation (rows 1 and
3, panel C).  With the same grouping, but with BANKSPREAD replaced by EXSPREAD, a one-
standard-deviation increase in the exchange rate differential is associated with a probability
increase of 3 (2.3) percentage points (rows 1 and 3, panel A).
Turning to an isolation of policy effects, note that adjustments in the policy credibility
proxies, BOLINFVOL and BOLDEPVOL, do not significantly influence the probability of a
dollar loan.  When combining CUMVALUE and EXSPREAD, for example, a one-standard-
deviation increase in Bolivian inflation volatility (depreciation volatility) raises the probability of
a dollar loan by 3.3 (2.4) percent (column 1, panels A and B).  The probability increase declines to
about 2 percent when EXSPREAD is replaced by BANKSPREAD (column 1, panels C and D). 
Hence, drastic reductions in inflation variability or depreciation variability would be necessary
before any economically significant decline in dollarization is observed.  
These results indicate that once externality effects from dollar usage are in place, it is
difficult for policymakers to achieve economically significant reductions in dollarization.  The
implementation of new goods pricing and financial market structures to accommodate dollar17
usage has led to significant reductions in transaction costs of dollar usage relative to Bolivian
currency usage.  To achieve widespread dedollarization, large incentives would have to be
provided to overcome the transactions cost savings.  One such incentive could be in the form of
significant reductions in domestic relative to U.S. inflation or its variability.  Our results suggest,
however, that small-scale fiscal and monetary policy restrictions, even if successful, may not be
sufficient to overcome dollarization.
VI.  Conclusion
This paper identifies network externalities from currency acceptability as a key
determinant of observed currency hysteresis.  Network externality effects on domestic versus U.S.
dollar usage in loan markets in Bolivia are quantified using macroeconomic observations together
with data from informal loan markets.  The probability of observing a dollar-denominated loan in
a particular region of Bolivia is shown to be positively related to various proxies capturing
positive network effects to agents from dollar usage.  The statistical significance of these network
proxies is robust to inclusion of macroeconomic policy-credibility variables.  The results suggest
that even credible and successful policy reforms may not be sufficient to overcome dollarization











Applying Lee’s procedure to our context involves three steps.  In the first step,  a
“reduced- form” probit is estimated for the probability of a dollar-denominated loan, based on
<17>, where the Bolivian interest rate is replaced by its exogenous determinants.  This probit
regression is then used to construct an inverse Mills ratio for each sample observation.  The
inverse Mills ratio is  =h( N )/H( N ), where   is a vector of probit coefficients and   is a matrix
of all independent variables from the reduced-form equation.  h(@) and H(@) are the normal and
cumulative density functions, respectively.    accounts for the truncation in the probability
distribution when the Bolivian interest rate is unobservable.  The second step of the procedure is
to enter the estimated inverse Mills-ratio value into an OLS subsample regression where Bolivian
interest rate observations form the dependent variable.  The third step substitutes the fitted interest
rate values into a “structural” probit model of equation <17>, which is estimated over the entire
sample.  Results from the third-step structural probit are in section III of the text.
The reduced-form probit that we estimate in the first step of Lee’s procedure is:
The exogenous determinants of the Bolivian interest rates are:
AMOUNT: Loans are made in either U.S. dollars or Bolivian currency.  Over the sample period
used, there were 4,269 domestic and 1,492 dollar loans registered.  The mean loan size of $588
and maximum loan of $16,320 imply a small economic scale of loan activity.




nature of the loans is characteristic of cyclical liquidity needs in the agricultural sector.
COLL: This variable is coded 1 if collateral has been offered to secure a loan, 0 otherwise. 
Collateral includes agricultural goods, personal co-signors, or real property.
BOLINFL: The expected future Bolivian inflation rate is expected to be a key determinant of the
nominal domestic interest rate in the informal market.  The inflation expectation is proxied by the
realized monthly percent change in the consumer price index.
The remaining variables in <A1> are identified in the text.  For the second step of Lee’s
procedure, an OLS interest rate regression is necessary to derive RBOL*.  The same exogenous
interest rate determinants and seasonal dummies are employed as those in <A1>.  The resulting
specification is:
where   is the inverse Mills ratio. t
In estimating the above equations we found strong selection bias in the left tail of the
Bolivian interest rate distribution, as indicated by a statistically significant negative coefficient on
.  This finding reinforces the appropriateness of Lee’s three-step censoring adjustment procedure t
that we apply in this study.20
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FOOTNOTES
1.  Extending the model to also include dollar deposits held by Bolivians abroad would not             
     change our key results.
2.  Whether the experience with dollar network factors alters the marginal transactions cost of        
      lending Bolivian pesos will determine whether   is positive or zero.
L
1,2
3.  An analogous relation can be derived for the domestic loan supply.
4.  We abstract from the consumption effects for empirical purposes because there are no                
      appropriate consumption proxies at the daily periodicity that loans are observed.
5.  Pesos were the official Bolivian currency prior to January 1987.  Thereafter, Bolivianos             
     became legal tender.  The conversion rate is 1 Boliviano = 1 million pesos.22
Table 1
Bolivian Macroeconomic Data Following the 1985 Stabilization Program
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Inflation (%) 11,750 276 15 16 15 17 21
Exchange Rate 1.69 1.92 2.21 2.47 2.98 3.40 3.75
   (Bol./$)
Fiscal Deficit (-) -1,182 -6 67 -79 -184 -262 -13
or Surplus
Dollar Loans/ .47 .77 .84 na na na na
Total Loans
(Informal)





M Beginning of period domestic cash balance t 
M Beginning of period dollar cash balance t
*
 e Nominal exchange rate (Bolivian currency per U.S. dollar) t
L    Domestic currency loan supply of an intermediary  t
L Dollar loan supply of an intermediary  t
*
R Net nominal interest rate on domestic currency loan t
R Net nominal interest rate on dollar loan t
*
P    Bolivian currency price per unit of the good t 
P Dollar price per unit of the good t
*
T         Index of loan supply externality factors
s
t
POL     Index of Bolivian policy credibility t
Y Total household endowment of the good t
T
Y Goods supplied in domestic market at domestic currency price t
Y Goods supplied in domestic market at dollar price t
*
l   Domestic currency loan demand of shopper t
l Dollar loan demand of shopper
*
t
T Index of loan demand externality factors
d
t
C   Shopper’s goods purchases at domestic currency price t
C Shopper’s goods purchases at dollar price
*
t24
Table 3  
Coefficient Estimates for Structural Probit <17>; T =CUMLOANS, T =EXSPREAD
ds
tt
Regression Number 1 2 3 4 5
CONSTANT -1.45*** -2.36*** -1.65*** -1.68*** 1.46***
(-3.89) (-7.00) (-4.88) (-4.48) (-3.98)
RBOL .005 -.029*** -.019*** .005 .007
(1.24) (-4.09) (-2.75) (0.26) (0.34)
DEX -.710 .278* -.622 -.473 .733**
(-1.63) (1.88) (-1.00) (-1.25) (2.03)
CUMLOANS 2.19*** 4.34*** 5.20*** 1.02 2.22***
(3.34) (7.59) (9.32) (1.48) (3.39)
EXSPREAD .00002* .00001*** .00001*** .00001** .00001**
(1.76) (2.94) (4.27) (2.58) (1.99)
DUMWIN .0052 -.027 -.023 -.003 -.0022
(0.07) (-0.34) (-0.29) (-0.04) (-0.03)
DUMSPR -.304*** -.347*** -.378*** -.260*** -.312***
(-3.70) (-4.23) (-4.69) (-3.12) (-3.80)
DUMSUM -.026 -.097 -.166** -.015 -.030
(-0.31) (-1.17) (-2.01) (-0.18) (-0.37)
INFMAX .0013*** ----- ----- ----- -----
(3.53)
INFVOLMAX ----- .00005*** ----- ----- -----
(18.03)
DEPVOLMAX ----- ----- 2.96*** ----- -----
(17.10)
REFORM85 ----- ----- ----- 2.83*** 2.52***
(4.92) (3.50)
BOLINFVOL ----- ----- ----- .00001** -----
(3.92)
BOLDEPVOL ----- ----- ----- ----- 1.43*
(1.77)
-2LogL 4129 4022 3988 4130 4131
% CORRECT PREDICT. 0.9189 0.9221 0.9221 0.9217 0.9186
Based on 5761 observations: 1-1-80 to 10-31-82; 10-1-85 to 6-30-87.  T-statistics in parentheses.
* (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.25
Table 4
Coefficient Estimates for Structural Probit <17>; T =CUMVALUE, T =EXSPREAD
ds
tt
Regression Number 1 2 3 4 5
CONSTANT -1.50*** -2.42*** -1.75*** -1.71*** -1.51***
(-4.03) (-7.21) (-5.18) (-4.55) (-4.12)
RBOL -.005 -.028*** -.017** .004 -.008
(-1.26) (-3.91) (-2.57) (0.24) (-1.37)
DEX .678 .302 -.563* -.457 -.703**
(1.25) (0.96) (-1.81) (-1.22) (-1.96)
CUMVALUE 1.66*** 3.33*** 3.98*** .764 1.69***
(3.39) (7.95) (9.76) (1.47) (3.44)
EXSPREAD .00001* .00001*** .00001*** .00003** .00001**
(1.71) (3.03) (4.33) (2.56) (1.94)
DUMWIN .004 -.028 -.024 -.004 -.004
(0.05) (-0.35) (-0.31) (-0.05) (-0.05)
DUMSPR -.298*** -.324*** -.351*** -.258*** -.305***
(-3.60) (-3.94) (-4.33) (-3.08) (-3.70)
DUMSUM -.017 -.788 -.142 .019 -.021
(-0.20) (-0.95) (-1.73) (0.22) (-0.26)
INFMAX .0013*** ----- ----- ----- -----
(3.45)
INFVOLMAX ----- .00001*** ----- ----- -----
(17.14)
DEPVOLMAX ----- ----- 2.86*** ----- -----
(16.19)
REFORM85 ----- ----- ----- 2.83*** 2.47***
(4.89) (3.40)
BOLINFVOL ----- ----- ----- .00004** -----
(3.88)
BOLDEPVOL ----- ----- ----- ----- 1.44*
(1.88)
-2LogL 4129 4028 3997 4144 4132
% CORRECT PREDICT. 0.9188 0.9221 0.9221 0.9219 0.9186
Based on 5761 observations: 1-1-80 to 10-31-82; 10-1-85 to 6-30-87.  T-statistics in parentheses.
* (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.26
Table 5
Coefficient Estimates for Structural Probit <17>; T =CUMLOANS, T =BANKSPREAD
ds
tt
Regression Number 1 2 3 4 5
CONSTANT -1.25*** -3.52*** -3.25*** -1.54*** -1.27***
(-3.39) (-9.84) (-8.52) (-3.94) (-3.43)
RBOL -.029* -.052** -.051*** -.024 -.028*
(-1.78) (-6.72) (-6.58) (-1.46) (-1.75)
DEX -.066 1.03*** .429 -.426 .668*
(-1.42) (3.18) (1.31) (-1.13) (1.88)
CUMLOANS 2.14*** 2.58*** 2.56*** 1.61*** 2.26***
(3.83) (4.88) (4.79) (2.75) (3.95)
BANKSPREAD .189* .835*** 1.09*** .108** .154**
(1.84) (7.78) (10.19) (1.89) (1.93)
DUMWIN -.0003 -.091 -.123 -.017 -.007
(-0.003) (-1.14) (-1.52) (-0.21) (-0.09)
DUMSPR -.245*** -.391*** -.452*** -.215*** -.253***
(-2.98) (-4.82) (-5.60) (-2.60) (-3.07)
DUMSUM -.063 -.047 -.093 -.059 -.069
(-0.79) (-0.61) (-1.21) (-0.75) (-0.39)
INFMAX .002*** ----- ----- ----- -----
(5.95)
INFVOLMAX ----- .00001*** ----- ----- -----
(12.89)
DEPVOLMAX ----- ----- 3.45*** ----- -----
(10.65)
REFORM85 ----- ----- ----- 3.48*** 3.04***
(7.00) (5.85)
BOLINFVOL ----- ----- ----- .00001*** -----
(2.98)
BOLDEPVOL ----- ----- ----- ----- .930*
(1.99)
-2LogL 4131 4074 4073 4141 4132
% CORRECT PREDICT. 0.9222 0.9222 0.9222 0.9219 0.9222
Based on 5761 observations: 1-1-80 to 10-31-82; 10-1-85 to 6-30-87.  T-statistics in parentheses.
* (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.27
Table 6
Coefficient Estimates for Structural Probit <17>; T =CUMVALUE, T =BANKSPREAD
ds
tt
Regression Number 1 2 3 4 5
CONSTANT -1.30*** -3.54*** -3.27*** -1.56*** -1.32***
(-3.49) (-9.92) (-8.89) (-3.99) (-3.54)
RBOL -.027 -.051*** -.050*** -.023* -.026*
(-1.39) (-6.50) (-6.37) (-1.92) (-2.09)
DEX -.631* 1.04*** .442 -.415 .645*
(-1.77) (3.21) (1.35) (-1.09) (1.82)
CUMVALUE 1.62*** 1.95*** 1.93*** 1.21*** 1.71***
(3.90) (4.96) (4.86) (2.77) (4.02)
BANKSPREAD -.200 .809*** 1.06*** -.118 .166**
(-1.38) (7.46) (9.80) (-0.80) (2.05)
DUMWIN -.0002 -.090 -.120 -.017 -.007
(-0.03) (-1.12) (-1.49) (-0.21) (-0.09)
DUMSPR -.239*** -.380*** -.440*** -.211*** -.246***
(-2.90) (-4.67) (-5.43) (-2.54) (-2.98)
DUMSUM -.053 -.380 -.078 -.028 -.058
(-0.66) (-0.42) (-1.02) (-0.52) (-0.73)
INFMAX .002*** ----- ----- ----- -----
(5.73)
INFVOLMAX ----- .00001*** ----- ----- -----
(11.46)
DEPVOLMAX ----- ----- 3.42*** ----- -----
(12.84)
REFORM85 ----- ----- ----- 2.94*** 2.96***
(6.82) (5.65)
BOLINFVOL ----- ----- ----- .00002** -----
(2.93)
BOLDEPVOL ----- ----- ----- ----- .918*
(1.92)
-2LogL 4131 4075 4073 4141 4132
% CORRECT PREDICT. 0.9222 0.9222 0.9222 0.9219 0.9222
Based on 5761 observations: 1-1-80 to 10-31-82; 10-1-85 to 6-30-87.  T-statistics in parentheses.
* (**) [***] denotes significance at the 10% (5%) [1%] level.28
Table 7
Predicted Values for the Probability of Observing a Dollar-Denominated Loan
PANEL A 1 2 3
CUMLOANS,   CUMLOANS,   CUMLOANS,
EXSPREAD   EXSPREAD     EXSPREAD
BOLINFVOL 0.6406 0.6700 0.6700
  BOLINFVOL 0.6736 -------- --------
BOLDEPVOL 0.5793 0.6443 0.6026
  BOLDEPVOL 0.6026 -------- --------
PANEL B 1 2 3
CUMVALUE,   CUMVALUE, CUMVALUE,
EXSPREAD   EXSPREAD     EXSPREAD
BOLINFVOL 0.6480 0.6808 0.6808
  BOLINFVOL 0.6844 -------- --------
BOLDEPVOL 0.4960 0.5714 0.5199
  BOLDEPVOL 0.5199 -------- --------
PANEL C 1 2 3
CUMLOANS,   CUMLOANS, CUMLOANS,
BANKSPREAD   BANKSPREAD     BANKSPREAD
BOLINFVOL 0.7123 0.7517 0.7224
  BOLINFVOL 0.7324 -------- --------
BOLDEPVOL 0.7291 0.7823 0.7454
  BOLDEPVOL 0.7422 -------- --------
PANEL D 1 2 3
CUMVALUE,   CUMVALUE, CUMVALUE,
BANKSPREAD   BANKSPREAD     BANKSPREAD
BOLINFVOL 0.7123 0.7580 0.7257
  BOLINFVOL 0.7324 -------- --------
BOLDEPVOL 0.7157 0.7764 0.7357
  BOLDEPVOL 0.7291 -------- --------
(.) denotes a one standard deviation increase in variable (.) above its mean.  Variables not
preceded by   are evaluated at their sample means.